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APPELLANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF

INTRODUCTION
This Supplemental Brief addresses issues raised in the trial
court and in the original brief, highlighting recent cases not
previously available to Appellant at the time of the preparation of
the brief. The arguments raised in this Supplemental Brief center
only

on Point

Two, as to the

admission

of

the

Defendant's

statements, and will follow the headings of the original brief.
Thereafter, the regular briefing schedule will then commence as to
the filing of Appellee's brief and Appellant's reply brief.

POINT TWO
ALLOWING DEFENDANTS STATEMENTS TO
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS WAS ERROR
A. ALLOWING THE STATEMENTS, WHICH
WERE NOT VOLUNTARY, WAS ERROR
In Arizona v. Fulminante. Ill S.Ct. 1246 (1991), the United
States Supreme Court held that the admission of an involuntary
confession in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process
clause is subject to a harmless-error analysis. The court reasoned
that the admission of a coerced confession belongs to the same
category

of

admission

trial

of

other

error

similar

in degree

types of evidence.

to the

Also

an

erroneous

involuntary

statement is not the type of error which transcends the criminal
process,

and

that

the

possible

dramatic

effect

of

coerced

statements at a trial is not such as to justify eschewing the
harmless-error test.
Fulminante contrasts with other cases in which the Supreme
Court has held that a constitutional error automatically requires
reversal of a conviction.

Gideon v. Wainwriqht, 372 U.S. 335

(1963) (Deprivation of right to counsel at trial);

Tumey v. Ohio.

273 U.S. 510 (1927) (Biased Trial Judge) and, Vasquez v. Hillery,
474 U.S. 254 (1986) (Exclusion of members of Defendant's race from
Grand Jury).
dissenting

Fulminante, an opinion fractured by concurring and

opinions, reasoned

that

there were two groups of

constitutional errors deserving of separate standards of review.
The two groups are identified as first, those involving matters
which amount to a structural defect affecting the framework within
2

which the trial proceeds, such as the lack of counsel problem in
Gideon, as opposed to the second category, which concerns errors in
the trial process itself.

The Fulminante case also involved a

dispute as to whether and upon what terms a coerced confession's
admission at trial would be "harmless". On these and other issues,
the varied opinions stressed the often conflicting federal case
law.

Contrast, Fulminante, Part I, II, & III, at 1250-1253

(Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Scalia), with Part II,
at 1253-1257 (Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens & White).
This Court has used the harmless-error standard in regards to
federal constitutional issues.
1213

(Utah

1989),

State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203,

(Hypnotic

testimony

and

the

right

of

confrontation), citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684
(1986) .

The Court in Tuttle did not use the analysis found in

Fulminante. And no other Utah decision has reviewed the harmlesserror

question

in

regards

to

coerced

statements

using

the

Fulminante reasoning. Although Appellant's original brief had used
the harmless-error standard, Fulminante now illustrates the extent
to which it would be impractical to continue the use of this often
contradictory guideline.

Since Appellant's trial, this Court has

issued a number of decisions emphasizing the greater extent of
Utah's Constitutional
federal rules.

protection over that offered under the

See, e.g., State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah

1990) (Auto searches), and State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah
1991) (Seizure of bank records).

The analysis used in Larocco,

that a confusing and contradictory federal standard may justify a
3

departure to a more evenly applied rule under Utah's Constitution,
provides ample justification for the Court to now impose a stricter
standard.

This standard should be that the use of a coerced

statement must require a reversal, regardless of whether the error
could be construed as harmless.
Assuming, arguendo,

that the Court uses the harmless-error

standard, Appellant contends that the use of his statements should
not be construed as harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, mindful of
the

fact that the Supreme Court ruled

Fulminante confession was in fact not

that

the use of the

harmless error.

In so

holding, the Court, at 1257, quoted from a dissenting opinion from
an earlier case, which said, "Certainly, confessions have profound
impact on the jury, so much so that we may justifiably doubt its
ability to put them out of mind even if told to do so". Bruton v.
United

States.

dissenting).
inherent

391

U.S.

123,

140

(1968)

(Justice

White,

The Court went on to note the risks of reliability

in coerced

statements which, when

coupled

with the

statement's profound impact on a jury, "...requires a reviewing
court to exercise extreme caution before determining that the
admission of the confession at trial was harmless". Fulminante, at
1258.
burden

And, the Court held, again at 1258, that the State has the
of establishing,

beyond

a reasonable

doubt,

that the

admission of the confession was harmless error.
The use of Mr. Allen's statements was anything but harmless.
In Fulminante. at 1259-1260, an important factor used by the Court
was the extent to which the other evidence supporting guilt weighed
4

in

comparison with the impact defendant's confession had on the

jury's verdict, and concluded that the remaining and largely
circumstantial

evidence

sufficient to convict.

standing

alone

would

not

have

been

Utah similarly requires that "...an error

is harmless if the overwhelming evidence of guilt makes it unlikely
beyond a reasonable doubt that the result would have been different
absent the error".
1989),

citing

State v. Tuttle. 780 P.2d 1203, 1213 (Utah

Delaware

v.

Van

Arsdall,

supra.

Mr.

Allen's

statements are certainly not harmless under this standard.
Appellant's original brief attacked the largely circumstantial
evidence. This included the early abuse acts, the lack of medical
findings as to cause and manner of death, and the weak, superficial
inferences drawn from such evidence as the contents of a destroyed
diary, and the prejudicial use of the child's autopsy photographs.
These problems lead to a doubt, certainly reasonable, that the
State's case, standing alone as a package without the support of
defendant's

admissions, would

not be sufficient

conviction.

State v. Tuttle, supra, at 1213;

to muster a

And, see State v.

Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 204 (Utah 1987) (Reversal required only if
there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the
accused had the error not occurred).
A recent case supports Appellant's contention that when the
Attorney General's investigator deliberately failed to read to the
Defendant the waiver portion of the Miranda form, that this act
deceived Mr. Allen to the extent that there was no effective waiver
of his right to remain silent, and that accordingly any statements
5

he made were involuntary.

United States v. Anderson. 929 F.2d 96,

100-101 (2nd Cir. 1991).

The factual setting condemned in this

case concerned an agent's warnings to a subject that a request for
an attorney would prevent the defendant's cooperation at a later
date, thereby losing the opportunity to win favorable treatment
from the government. The Court held, at 100, that "affirmative
misrepresentations by the police may be sufficiently coercive to
invalidate a suspect's waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege",
citing Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534-535 (1963), and Spano
v. New York. 360 U.S. 315, 322-323 (1959).

Officer Hines' conduct

meets the standard used in these cases. He testified he rushed to
Montana to interrogate Allen, and to avoid "jail contaminance",
(sic)

i.e.,

prisoner

Hearing, Tr. 34.

advice

to

contact

lawyers.

Suppression

He also acknowledged that his not reading

suspects the waiver portion of his Miranda form was standard
practice. This routine enabled him to place little emphasis on the
waiver language, lulling Allen into talking.

Concealing these

rights was more effective than actually misstating the rule. This
conduct

surely

reaches

the

level

of

"affirmative

misrepresentations" disapproved of in United States v. Anderson,
supra.
Recent case law also supports Appellant's argument that his
illegal arrest in Idaho, his removal to Montana, and the beating he
received in the process was not attenuated to the point where his
subsequent

statements would be admissible.

United States v.

Anderson, supra, and State v. Carter, 162 Utah Adv. Rep. 32, 36-37
6

(Utah App. 1991).

Carter involved the question of the taint of an

illegal detention upon a subsequent consent. The Court listed, at
36, four factors to consider when determining whether the consent
was obtained as a result of an exploitation of a prior illegality,
which include: (1) Miranda warnings, (2), the passage of time, (3),
presence of intervening circumstances, and (4) , the flagrancy of
the illegality. These considerations would apply in Mr. Allen's
situation.

State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141, 150-151 (Utah App. 1991).

In Sims, at 151, the Court held that the burden was on the State to
prove that evidence obtained following illegal police conduct was
attenuated

from

that

illegality.

Sims

also

held

that

an

examination of the flagrancy of the primary police illegality was
in order even though this factor is unrelated to other factors
under consideration, and that the flagrancy of the conduct alone
could merit imposition of constitutional sanctions. Sims, supra, at
151.
And, in United States v. Anderson, supra, at 101, the Court
noted

that

"...the use of coercive

and

improper

tactics in

obtaining an initial confession may warrant a presumption of
compulsion as to a second one, even if the latter was obtained
after properly administered Miranda warnings", citing Oregon v.
Elstad. 470 U.S. 298, 314 (1985).
Allen's

situation, the Court

And, closely paralleling Mr.

in Anderson

commented

that the

interrogating agent made no effort to dispel the original threats.
The Court concluded, at 102, that suppression of the statements
served two purposes:

"It operates as a disincentive for police to
7

coerce a confession by threatening a defendant with false and/or
misleading statements.

The fact-finding process is also enhanced

since a confession obtained in the manner this one was may be
untrustworthy".
Appellant also claims that the trial Courtfs refusal to allow
the jury to listen to the tape recording of the events of the
arrest and the abuse suffered by Mr. Allen at the hands of the
arresting

officers,

which

pertained

to

the

issue

of

the

voluntariness of his later statements, violates his due process and
Sixth Amendment fair trial protection. Crane v. Kentucky. 476 U.S.
683 (1986). A recent Florida case supports this contention. Barber
v. State, 576 So.2d 825 (Florida App. 1991).
Barber involved a defense request to play an interrogation
tape, not for the truthfulness of the statements made by the
Defendant, but to allow jurors to gauge the extent to which the
suspect's speech reflected intoxication which in turn was critical
as to the issue of homicidal intent. The Court reasoned that while
a self serving declaration would be hearsay, it could be offered
for some other reason, so long as it was material to some issue in
the case. And the Court said: "Because of the trial court's ruling,
the jury was deprived of a means of assessing appellant's defense
that he was too intoxicated to formulate the intent required for
first degree murder". Barber, supra, at 830-831.

The Court also

referred to a recent U.S. Supreme Court case, Pennsylvania v.
Muniz, 110 S.Ct. 2638 (1990), which held that the State could
introduce a videotaping of a DUI suspect's speech and actions
8

without running afoul of constitutional limitations. These recent
authorities support Appellant's contention that the court committed
error in not allowing the jury to hear the arrest tape on the issue
of whether his statements were voluntary.

B.

ALLOWING THE STATEMENTS ABSENT
COMPLIANCE WITH THE MIRANDA
REQUIREMENTS WAS ERROR

In McNeil v. Wisconsin. Ill S.Ct. 2204

(1991), the U.S.

Supreme Court recently analyzed the difference between the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments to the

United States Constitution when

considering whether a suspect has invoked his right to counsel.
The Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was "case
specific", and that an invocation as to questioning as to one crime
does not, under the standards of Oregon v. Elstad, Supra. Minnick
v. Mississippi, 111 S.Ct. 486 (1990),

and Edwards v. Arizona, 451

U.S. 477 (1981), prevent a police officer from later interrogating
the subject as to a different offense

so long as they comply with

the Fifth Amendment-Miranda rules.
Mr. Allen's situation involved a quick and turbulent exchange
as to the law between himself and Sheriff Printz' deputies.

One

officer began but did not finish reading the Miranda rights.
Arrest Transcript. Tr. 3.

A violent encounter ensued, and Allen

screamed "Read my rights", and said "I ain't supposed to say
nothing". Tr. 5.

Another officer later followed up on that by

telling the subject: "Hay, you're just lucky you're not dead.
could have done it the easy way and just popped ya.
9

We

Saved the

county a lot of money to try your ass. You know it?". Tr. 8.
Appellant claims that he again invoked his right to counsel at the
Ravelli county jail and later during interrogation.

However,

Messrs. Printz and Hines claim Allen only mentioned an attorney at
the end of their questioning, and then only in regards to a
discussion about extradition. Motions Hearing, Tr. 29, 67. These
events and the colloquy between suspect and police, even assuming
the truth of the officer's version of the post-arrest events,
constitute an invocation.
In McNeil v. Wisconsin, supra, at 2209, the Court stated that
an

adversarial

relationship

between

suspect

and

interrogator

attached as a result of a pending prosecution, thereby requiring
Sixth Amendment protection.
6, 11 (Kan. 1991).

See, also, State v. Hamons, 805 P.2d

And, in State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100 (Utah

App. 1991), the court considered

invocation questions without

distinguishing between the Sixth Amendment and Fifth Amendment
considerations found in the McNeil case.

Sampson held that once

there was an equivocal request for counsel, this request could not
be ignored, at 1114-1116, regardless of the language in Edwards,
supra, at 484-485, that the right must be "clearly asserted".
Accordingly, the Sampson court held, at 1114, that the officers
must

only take actions to clarify the request,

and that an

equivocal request must be treated in that regard as one which was
unambiguous. The ruling in Sampson contrasts with the situation in
Mr. Allen's case, where there was no clarification.

Indeed, the

opposite occurred, when Mr. Hines deceived the Defendant by not
10

reading the waiver portion of the Miranda form.

And, in a ruling

that has great significance for Appellant's situation, Sampson, at
1114, held that "Neither the passage of time, however great, nor
the administration

of additional Miranda warnings will allow

officers to reconvene interrogation absent clarification".

D.

This

Court

THE COURT'S FINDINGS AND CONCONCLUSIONS WERE INADEQUATE

recently

further

addressed

inadequate findings of fact in the trial court.
159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (Utah 1991).

the

problem

of

State v. Ramirez,

Ramirez dealt with factual

issues as to a search and seizure question the resolution of which
was a necessary

prerequisite to the admission

identification testimony.

of eyewitness

The Court held that search and seizure

issues were highly fact sensitive, that detailed findings are
necessary
assumption

for meaningful
supporting

the

appellate review,
trial

court's

that there

decision,

that

is an
this

assumption would be inappropriate if there was unresolved evidence
as to a factual issue, and that accordingly the appropriate remedy
if the evidence was ambiguous would be a reversal of the conviction
and the remanding of the case for a new trial. Ramirez, supra, at
15.
Miranda issues are likewise highly fact sensitive. See, e.g.,
Layton City v. Aragon, 163 Utah Adv. Rep. 44, 46 (Utah App. 1991);
State v. Carter, supra, at 36, 39.
11

And while the trial court's

decision as to these issues are questions of fact, they also
involve

questions

of

particular deference.

law

that

this

Court

should

accord

no

State v. Wilcox, 808 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1991).

In denying Appellant's Suppression Motion, the Court made certain
comments at the conclusion of Mr. Allen's suppression hearing.
See, Appendix Number II, Appellant's Brief.
brief

identified

instances

where

these

Appellant's initial
comments

were

mere

conclusions, or where they could be construed as findings, failed
to address crucial facts adequate to resolve many of the issues of
law raised by the defense.
For instance, one important contention by Appellant is that
his arrest in Idaho by Montana law officers and removal back to
Montana was unlawful, thereby tainting any subsequent evidence that
may have been obtained from him, including his statements. Ramirez
dealt with a similar issue in the context of an unlawful seizure
which lead to an eyewitness identification. Ramirez. supra, at 15.
The reversal in Ramirez came about because the trial court failed
to resolve ambiguities in the arresting officers' versions of their
encounter with the suspect which were crucial in determining
whether defendant's seizure was lawful.

In Mr. Allen's case, the

Court's comments at the conclusion of the suppression hearing
centered on compliance with Miranda requirements, waiver of the
right to remain silent, the credibility of the witnesses, and other
matters.

However, the Court never stated facts focusing on the

officers' intrusion into Idaho's jurisdiction and performing an
impromptu

extradition

without

benefit
12

of

legal

process,

or

resolving the impact that this situation may have had on the
Defendant's subsequent interrogation.
Still another shortcoming in the "findings" dealt with the
failure of the trial court to resolve the ambiguities in officer
Hines' testimony.

Mr. Hines assured the Court that he and Sheriff

Printz had fully informed Mr. Allen of the Miranda rights and
offered him every opportunity to obtain legal counsel, which the
Court apparently accepts in its statement denying the motion, See,
Appendix II, supra.

However, the Court did not consider officer

Hines1 conflicting admission that he had read Allen only portions
of the Miranda form, thereby omitting the critical "waiver of
rights" language.

Nor did the Court address with Mr. Hines1

admission that he had intentionally not shown Allen the entire form
or obtained his signature thereon. See, Plaintiff's Exhibit Number
Seven; Suppression Motion, Tr. 38-39; Trial, Tr 596-598; 614-616.
The failure to analyze and resolve these factual conflicts is a
shortcoming which certainly violates the standards set forth in
Ramirez.
And

finally,

this

Court

should

compare

the

attenuation

standards set out in State v. Carter, supra, with the language of
the trial court's ruling. Few facts were discussed by the court as
to what may have occurred in the jail or during the interrogation
which dissipated the taint of the abuse Mr. Allen suffered during
his arrest, a critical issue under such cases as State v. Sims,
supra. This defect should be resolved by sending the case back to
the trial court.
13

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated in Appellant's original brief, and this
Supplemental Brief, Mr. Allen's conviction should be reversed, and
a new trial ordered.
DATED this 11th day of July, 1991.

Eric P. Swenson

jfiULjd.

Michael H. Wray
Attorneys for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned counsel for Appellant hereby affirms and
certifies that he did mail four true and correct copies of the
foregoing to the Office of the Utah Attorney General, addressed to
Robert N. Parrish and Christine F. Soltis, at 236 State Capitol,
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114, this 12th day of July, 1991.
DATED this 12th day of July, 1991.

By :
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Eric P. Swenson
Michael H. Wray
Attorneys for Appellant
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